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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report focuses on Surface Transportation (ST), both fixed and route-based, and the
growing threats to their information technology (IT) infrastructures. As an industry, ST
seeks to optimize the movement of people and goods, while ensuring safety and resiliency
and minimizing environmental impact. Cyber threats are a powerful medium for those with
the political, social, and economic motivations and wherewithal to disrupt and destroy
existing ST systems. Yet with current funding levels, often determined as about 4% of the
IT budget, the cybersecurity industry struggles to protect organizations in fields ranging
from federal and state governments to private industry.
The ST industry’s current drive to improve services and reduce costs through automation
is rapidly leading to advances that will be even more difficult to protect if security measures
are not built-in from the start. It is a truism that soon every physical system will be remotely
controllable over the Internet. Yet all systems that are theoretically controllable for legitimate
purposes can also be accessed for malicious purposes. The access given to the trusted
insider may also provide access to the attacker.
What are the odds of an attack, and how much must be spent in order to prevent one?
Attackers need only be successful once; defenders need to be successful every time. The
acceptance of this reality results in different security strategies and resiliency response plans.
In order to address the above, this paper follows the structure detailed below:
• Cyber State of Affairs provides an overview on the current level of cybersecurity in
the ST industry in three sections. The first underlines that a successful cybersecurity
initiative is predicated on understanding and modeling the problem completely. It
also provides an industry overview of current cybersecurity practices. The second
underlines just how inadequate current protection from cyberattacks is. The third
proposes a better way of understanding and modeling cyber threats.
• Managing Cyber Risks and Business Exposure, also divided in three sections,
provides a more detailed approach to understanding various cybersecurity issues
and management strategies to abate them. The first section aims to illustrate
attackers’ motives. The second section identifies typical cybersecurity vulnerabilities
and risks faced by organizations. The somewhat larger third section proposes
improved management structures and underlines the roles of different departments
within a typical organization in helping address cybersecurity issues.
• Conclusion: Eleven Lessons Learned summarizes the above two sections into
eleven key ‘lessons’ regarding the current state of cybersecurity in ST organizations
and introduces the proposed Surface Transportation Cyber-Protection Model and
Reference Architecture detailed in Part B of this paper.
The ultimate objective is to develop a new paradigm to define, describe, design, and
deploy the most effective protection, at the lowest cost, in the shortest time within the limits
of available resources. This paper seeks to initiate a critical peer discussion to explore
innovation in the cyber protection of ST systems.
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e
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I. CYBER STATE-OF-AFFAIRS
Cyber systems are virtual and, therefore, difficult to manage. The ephemeral nature of
network connections, computers, and digital data makes defining and understanding their
inherent risks very challenging. As a result, it is also difficult to justify and quantify the
degree of protection and associated level of investment that are needed when the threats
are not well-understood.
Understanding the physical world, as opposed to the virtual, is relatively straightforward,
since it is tangible and measurable. To affect the real world, it is necessary to get into
contact with it. The virtual world removes this constraint, enabling remote access to devices
that control physical systems.
Using the cyber world as a means to disrupt real world events has proven to be very
effective. For example, the Stuxnet computer worm, considered the world’s first digital
weapon, is credited with successfully disrupting Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear
weapon.1 Appendix C provides examples of threats or events that demonstrate the
implications of poor cybersecurity on the physical operation of railway systems. If cyber
security measures are insufficient, disruptive malware can unwittingly be distributed to
vast numbers of endpoints overnight.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first, entitled The Truth of the Matter
Matters, describes the two major software engineering approaches to cybersecurity and
illustrates how more and more physical and logical systems are remotely controllable via
an Internet connection. The second, The New Normal is Inadequate, illustrates the large
degree to which current cybersecurity practices, especially in the Surface Transportation
(ST) industry, are lacking. The third, There Must Be a Better Way, provides a high-level
overview of the potential solutions that are explained in greater depth later in the paper.

THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER MATTERS
For most ST organizations today, an imminent cyberattack would result in nothing short
of a disaster. Although some comfort can be gained in the knowledge that peers within
the ST industry are not alone in this issue,
The question is not: Have we done
the reality is that most companies most likely
enough? The answer is clear—no
underinvest in cybersecurity and hence are
one has done enough.
dangerously exposed.
The question is: What do we do
In software engineering, there are two schools of
about it now?
thought on designing cybersecurity: secure-bydesign and secure-by-default. Secure-by-design
systems are designed from the “ground up” to be secure from threats, while secure-bydefault systems are designed to have the default configuration settings be the most secure
settings possible, sometimes at the expense of user-friendliness.2 Yet both design patterns
are rarely found in current ST systems, requiring security to function as a Band-Aid, which
increases the complexity of the necessary security measures, downgrading performance
and user experience.
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Increasingly, physical systems are being virtually controlled by applications accessed over
the Internet. A common example of this phenomenon in surface transportation systems is
the use of industrial control systems, which are commonly used to control subways and
other rail infrastructure. If these applications are accessible over the Internet for legitimate
purposes, then they can be compromised and accessed for malicious purposes as well.
The only thing that separates the two is intent.
The attempt to provide security does not always entail adequate protection. There are
many reasons why protection is especially difficult to achieve, even when security has
been provided. Ineffective security often results from basic factors such as improper
configuration of security measures and poor basic information technology (IT) hygiene.
Inadequate funding is also responsible for ineffective security, as it naturally degrades
over time. Security management often suffers from inadequate communication and
measurement, which is then exacerbated by the difficulty of tracking threats.
Protecting a complex organization with bad IT is impossible. Humans are often the weak
link for specialized social engineering attacks. An example of this is ransomware attacks,
where IT or other employees are baited into clicking on a link which subsequently installs
malware on their system, potentially allowing an infection of other systems within the
organization. The malware then allows the attacker to steal data and hold it at a ransom.
Cybersecurity is now far too complex to be managed by humans, yet the main tool used
in security today by practitioners is Microsoft Excel.

THE NEW NORMAL IS INADEQUATE
Fortunately, through breach notification laws, we are learning of breaches almost daily.
Unfortunately, the high exposure to these breaches has numbed our senses. The recent
breach of a credit score company, releasing the detailed financial data of 143 million
Americans, reflected a new low in standard of care.3 In the ST domain, a 2016 breach
exposing 57 million accounts of a global taxi technology company remained undisclosed
for more than a year.4 The company later paid a $100,000 ransom to the hackers to delete
their copy of the stolen data.
The question after a cybersecurity breach asked by those who are harmed is always:
Did they do enough? In most cases, more should have been done, and lawsuits claiming
inadequate care are routine. Historically, most breaches have been traced back to the
exploitation of IT vulnerabilities that were well known and for which patches were available
for over a year (see Appendix B).
The IT vulnerabilities in the transportation domain are no different. Transportation providers
(both public and private) are dependent on IT systems similar to those employed by other
industries, and thus are just as likely to under-invest in cybersecurity measures. Even
when the proper investments are made, there is no reason why a malicious Organized
Attacker Group, given sufficient time and resources, cannot take control of a critical surface
transportation system that is legitimately accessed and controlled over the Internet.
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THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY
There are many reasons why security has failed to provide adequate protection. Security
cannot provide protection at all costs, because such a goal is financially unfeasible. There
must be a reasonable level of investment to provide adequate protection, meeting the
security expectations of customers at a price they are willing to pay.
Security after design—namely, where security is introduced as an after-thought—is less
effective and costlier to maintain than security-by-design—namely, where security is
integrated into the architecture of the IT system from the ground-up. Unfortunately, when
it comes down to a choice between more features in a system and more cybersecurity,
security is often the loser. In these all-too-common cases, security must be applied after
design, making the asset more difficult to protect.
Additionally, the importance of maintaining good system hygiene and a minimal, wellhardened attack surface has also been ignored. With most of today’s compromises resulting
from the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in IT assets, keeping them securely configured
and patched is a critical first step towards better hygiene. Once done, it is advisable to
understand the points of vulnerability—or the “attack surface”—in an IT system. The attack
surface relates to the IT devices whose IP addresses are exposed to the Internet. The
number of these public IP addresses should be minimized and highly controlled. Such public
facing devices should be securely configured and any modification detected.
Today, given the early stages of security automation, processes are manual and humans
are “in-the-loop” in most aspects of security. Given the severe shortage of experienced
security professionals and the number of open positions, a large number of inadequately
trained practitioners have and will continue to enter the space. At the same time, the
complexity, interconnectedness, and sheer size of existing systems has outpaced most
humans’ ability to effectively secure them.
To address these problems, the first step is for humans to identify the complexity and size
of the systems and the degree to which they are automated. Additionally, measures to
closely track the size, interconnectedness, and weak points of existing systems must be
put in place. The next step is then to visualize and analyze such information, which will
allow for better understanding of security weaknesses across all strata of ST organizations.
Additionally, this level of understanding will allow security systems to be automated,
allowing for more efficient counter-hacking measures.
Unfortunately, current cybersecurity best practice standards and regulations and the ability
of most organizations to implement them fall short.5 In response, this paper proposes the
basis for an enhancement of how security controls are defined, interpreted, measured,
visualized, and communicated. The proposed enhancement will greatly improve existing
methods to define, measure, and represent an organization’s state-of-security, state-ofprotection, and state-of-compliance, hence allowing for the ability to develop and deploy
more effective countermeasures to security threats.
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The proposed enhancement is a taxonomy advancement called the Security Control
Expressions (SCE). A SCE explicitly describes the relationship between security delivered
by security assets and the protection received by business assets. Cyber threats and
countermeasures can be expressed, associated, measured, visualized, and analyzed in
powerful new ways. The impact can be transformational for the security industry, resulting
in the ability to protect surface transportation systems at adequate levels as soon as
reasonably possible.
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II. MANAGING CYBER RISKS AND BUSINESS EXPOSURE
The preceding sections sought to establish awareness of the many facets of the ST
industry’s cybersecurity issue, an idea of where organizations currently are, and what they
are facing. Yet establishing and defining the current issues in the field is not enough.
If cyber risks are not on the minds of business leaders and ST organizations, then new
approaches to describing the threats and potential damages must be devised. The best
way to do so is to express the potential impact in financial terms, such as net income
exposure and current and future revenue growth exposure. When viewed through the
lens of the bottom line, executive leaders at ST organizations, both public and private,
can compare the costs and benefits of cybersecurity with other business initiatives. By
changing the way in which the need for cybersecurity is presented, the urgency of the
issue can be stated much more clearly.
Unfortunately, it is challenging to express cyber risks in financial terms. This communication
barrier is responsible for the chasm that exists today between those who work on technical
issues and those who work in the business realm. This divide between the fiduciary
business layers and IT security is largely responsible for the universal underinvestment
in security. Addressing the current issues in cybersecurity management, especially in the
ST industry, requires addressing many common misconceptions. Key misconceptions that
routinely endanger cybersecurity are addressed below.
The first common misconception is that security is the sole responsibility of the Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO). This formal position is where all matters cyber are
centrally managed and reported. However, it is more productive to have a business and
risk-focused person who can synthesize and communicate to senior executives in language
aligned to their concerns. An organization without such a position does not have the necessary
resources to improve their standard-of-care. Cybersecurity is a complex field and requires
good management practices to avoid the typical waste cycle of security investments.
While CISOs certainly serve a critical role in cybersecurity, there are many other important
responsibilities that are typically the responsibility of other executives. The objective is to
manage cyber risk, and there are several risk treatment methods. For example, setting
and establishing reasonable risk acceptance levels is a fiduciary responsibility that guides
businesses on the question of the limits of the risk they should accept. Risk indemnification,
transfer, and avoidance risk treatment measures are the purview of the legal team and the
General Council. A common error is that CISOs commonly report to the Chief Information
Officer (CIO). Because the CIO is concerned with rapid advancement and cost reductions
rather than cautiousness and the inherently
costly nature of cybersecurity, it is a conflict of
Stop the intent of the attack.
interest for the CISO to report to the CIO. For
this reason, the CISO should instead report to
Stop them from getting out, not
the General Council or the Chief Risk Officer,
from getting in.
which will be able to better handle the difficult
and costly tradeoffs regarding cybersecurity.
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A second reality that must be accepted is the recognition that it is virtually impossible to stop
a persistent, well-resourced, and sophisticated attacker. It is therefore important to focus
beyond denial-of-access measures (also known as “fence building”) to hackers and other
security threats, but to also develop the capabilities to constrain movement, detect anomalous
behavior, and ensure that attackers cannot exit systems with important information. These
counter-measures require a different set of security skills and technologies compared to
simply denying access. compared to simply denying access. These skills are centered
around data analysis, anomalous behavior detection, and fraud prevention.
It is important to think strategically and plan tactically about how to stop the intent of the
attack, as opposed to only the attack itself. The attack has a motive, and it is not limited
to just getting in. One way to understand the motive of the attacker is by tracking their
movements once they have gained access to your system. However, it takes a mature
organization to track an attacker without the attacker’s awareness, since security response
actions provide indicators to the attacker that they have been detected. Once an attacker
is aware that they are being tracked, they become much more difficult to find as they often
go into “sleep” mode, yielding little information to the trackers watching them.
The following sections provide a detailed outline of the problem and the approaches to
solving it. First, the different motives of potential attackers are discussed in the following
subsection, entitled “Why Would They Attack Me?”. Next, “Cyber Risks Created by
Cyber Threats” details specific cybersecurity risks to organizations. Lastly, “Cyber Risk
Management and Achieving a Reasonable Standard-of-Care” outlines a management
structure to effectively handle cybersecurity at all stages of a potential attack, assigning
roles to each department within a typical ST organization.

WHY WOULD THEY ATTACK ME?
The following section describes distinct types of cybersecurity threats faced by the
ST industry. Each type of threat includes either possible targets within ST systems or
successful attacks targeting the particular vulnerability. These threats are summarized
below in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Cyber Threats by Motive & Intent
• Cyber Terrorism: The intent is to disrupt the target’s physical systems by remotely
taking over control systems and either shutting them down, opening them up,
destabilizing them, or otherwise operating them beyond design limits. The impact
of a cyber-terrorist taking control of a target’s IT system is dependent on the design
and operational characteristics of that system, but it has been shown that logical
(virtual) actions can lead to real world, kinetic events. An example of a specific
threat of this type in the ST industry is attacks on rail balise systems, which convey
real-time information about train and track positions. These systems have been
found to have significant security vulnerabilities in existing literature.6
• Cyber Crime: The intent is to steal health, financial, and personal information of
employees and customers for money through identity theft and financial fraud.
• Cyber Espionage: The intent is to steal transportation technology secrets,
intellectual property and proprietary information, such as pricing, for competitive
gain, lowering their own costs of development and shortening the time it takes to
enter the market with these new technologies.
• Cyber Hacktivism: The intent is to dispense punishment for a real or perceived
injustice. This can include disclosing confidential data or interrupting the normal
operation of a ST system. An example of this came in 2011, when hackers infected
a website for the Bay Area Rapid Transit police union, and released the personal
information of over 100 officers to protest the agency’s shutting down of Wi-Fi in
underground tunnels.7
• Cyber Extortion: The intent is to take sole control of data for profit, make it
unintelligible by malicious encryption, and demand compensation for its reliable
recovery. One example of such an attack in the ST industry is the 2016 San Francisco
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Municipal Transportation Agency ransomware hack, where hackers compromised
more than 2,000 servers at the agency, holding confidential information at a ransom
of 100 bitcoin.8
It is essential that we have an unbiased, scientific view of the cyber threat landscape.
Appendix B references the U.S. Secret Service and Verizon data breach investigations,
now in their tenth year. These documents exemplify state-of-the art thinking and an
unbiased analysis of the current cyber threat landscape.

CYBER RISKS CREATED BY CYBER THREATS
What damages can result from the above threats, if realized? The following are ST-specific
risks that can be realized from cyber threats. The nature of the damages varies by the
impacted asset. Risk is proportional to the likelihood of the compromise being realized
multiplied by its impact. Each risk detailed below is associated with a potential outcome or
concrete consequence of an attack that has been carried out on a ST system in the past.
These risks are displayed in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Cyber Threats Creating Business Risks
• Delivery Risk: The inability to deliver and operate products and services; this is
largely a risk incurred by cyber terrorism. An example of this risk being realized
occurred in a 2014 Michigan experiment, where researchers were able to break into
a local network of traffic lights, gaining control of almost 100 intersections.9
• Customer Risk: The loss of passenger confidence in the safety and reliability of
system after a cybersecurity breach. For many transportation agencies, however,
the lack of competition means this risk is less significant compared to others. Those
relying on public transportation as a primary mode of transportation rarely have
alternative options.
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• Competitive Risk: Financial loss resulting from theft of trade secrets, proprietary
information, and intellectual property.
• Disclosure Risk: The theft and unauthorized release of personal customer
and employee data. Although this normally regards customer data, as in the
aforementioned taxi company breach, employee data is a target as well; in 2016,
ISIS-affiliated hackers broke into a New Jersey Transit police website and published
officers’ personal information and names on Twitter.10
• Product Risk: Financial loss resulting from liability claims of inadequate care in
preventing system compromises.
The risks defined above can be separated into two categories. Delivery and product
risks largely pertain to the physical components of a surface transportation system,
exemplified in the examples provided of such risks being realized. Delivery risk can be
thought of as impacting the operation of existing components, while product risk can
be thought of as impacting the design and integrity of the components themselves. The
other risk categories pertain to breaches and leaks of sensitive data, be it the personal
data of employees or customers, or trade secrets—for example, in the autonomous
vehicle industry. Appendix A contains further information on risks and risk management
strategies specific to rail infrastructure.

CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT AND ACHIEVING A REASONABLE
STANDARD-OF-CARE
When realized, the above risks create financial exposure. Financial exposure is the cost
of liabilities related to claims of inadequate care, breach-related costs where customers
must be notified and protected, and fines from regulators, which vary depending on the
findings of the incident. Financial exposure does not include the costs of conducting dayto-day security.
Addressing and managing this financial exposure is one of the key foci of the following two
subsections. Additionally discussed are concrete management structures and processes
that are necessary to achieve an appropriate standard-of-care—the level of due care
exercised by agencies, operators, and companies—in ST organizations.

Stakeholder Journey to Reasonable Standard-of-Care
Figure 3 illustrates the management cycle of assessing and improving the cybersecurity
standard-of-care, and consequently reducing residual exposure. Each step in the process
is associated with the specific department within an organization that is responsible for it
(left of the figure).
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Figure 3. Standard-of-Care Evaluation Cycle
Key to Figure 3 are the two distinct sides. The left side illustrates the current level of
protection, its associated risk, and the residual exposure. The right side illustrates the
desired future standard-of-care, the risk treatment, and methods for future protection
against that risk. Assessing levels of protection, both current and future, is the role of the
Security, Risk & Compliance, and IT departments. Transferring this information to tangible
financial and legal ramifications is the role of the Financial and Legal departments.
Interpreting this data and deciding on the acceptable exposure and standard-of-care is
the role of the Board of Directors, Audit Committee and the Executive Committee.
The first step in the journey to an acceptable standard-of-care is assessing the residual
exposure, defined as the potential financial loss incurred if the accepted risk is realized.
This exposure level should reasonably allow an organization to recover after a successful
attack. To assess whether the level of residual exposure is appropriate, a quarterly review
and decision cycle must be put in place in order to keep the standard-of-care up-to-date with
the organization’s infrastructure. If an organization has excessive residual exposure, and
potential financial loss from an attack is not financially recoverable, then the organization
must improve the standard-of-care.
Key to the concept of residual exposure is understanding the role and size of the ST
organization within a broader ecosystem of services and other organizations, knowing the
potentially valuable assets of one’s organization, and the motives of a potential attack. By
knowing one’s state of security and therefore how protected business assets are, one can
estimate the residual exposure.
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Based on the result of the assessment, fiduciary management determines whether the
nature and level of risk and exposure is reasonable or excessive. If deemed excessive,
investments are made to improve the standard-of-care. This process includes addressing
the sources of potential risks with different treatment options and investing in in risk
mitigation. It also includes selecting and deploying additional protection measures designed
to protect against specific threats.
The overall objective of this cycle is to ensure the adequate protection of the most critical
dependencies of the most valuable processes with the highest exposure. This strategy
ensures that with limited time and resources, the most important risks are taken care of
first. The process starts with understanding which assets underpin which type of risk, level
of severity, and likelihood. Once this is understood, measures can be taken to reduce both
the likelihood and impact.

Cyber Response by Stakeholder and Attack Stage
An accurate, clear, and concise set of terms describing the processes of cyberattacks
and their induced responses is key to improving responses to and reducing the costs of
addressing cyber threats. This section outlines a set of terms defining the progressive
stages of a successful attack, the responses incurred at each stage of an attack, and the
roles of each stratus of an organization during a stage of attack.
Before identifying responses to an attack, it is important to understand how a cyberattack
occurs. Defined below are the progressive stages of a successful attack.
• Attack: Organizations are attacked thousands of times a day, even tens of thousands
of times if they are high-value targets. For example, financial, health, or technology
companies typically house valuable personal information and intellectual property,
making them frequent targets of cyberattacks.
• Compromise: An attack has been successful and the attacker is “inside the network”
performing unauthorized activities with malicious intent. Some organizations have
no idea if they are compromised or not.
• Incident: Once detected, the compromise becomes an incident and incident response
is initiated. Less mature organizations often attempt to shut down impacted systems
and remediate immediately, telling the attackers that they have been found. More
mature security organizations start a cat-and-mouse game to contain the attacker
without the attacker knowing, with the objective to learn their intent and discover the
full implication of the compromise.
• Breach: The objective of responding to an incident is to prevent it from becoming a
breach. A breach should not be confused with being compromised. Rather, breach
is strictly reserved as a term that implies a strong legal response must be triggered.
If an incident was successfully contained, it does not constitute a breach.
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The only opportunities for an organization to respond to an attack are during the
compromise and incident stages. Any attempt to engage with attackers after an attack is
successful is risky and potentially illegal, as indicated in an example cited earlier in this
paper, where a global taxi technology company ended up complying with a $100,000
ransom payout to hackers.
Since the form of the risk and corresponding countermeasures vary by attack stage, it is
best to look at cyber risks as the attack materializes, progresses, and changes. Based on
this approach, appropriate responses by different stages are illustrated in Figure 4, and
are as follows:

Figure 4. Cyber Response by Attack Stage
• Before Stage: The objective is to prevent an attack from becoming a compromise.
This first response stage focuses on governance and building a corresponding
security program (i.e., an ability to protect) that is deemed reasonable by key external
stakeholders. Therefore, responses in this stage are focused on ‘fence building,’ with
the objective of keeping the attackers out. However, at a certain point, additional
investments in such security measures will have diminishing protection returns. At
that point, a shift in strategy to the next stage of responses is recommended.
• During Incident Stage: The focus of this stage is to contain the incident and prevent
it from escalating into a breach, the successful intent of the attack. If the intent of the
attack also triggers a public event, such as Breach Notification Laws, it is a breach
that also causes reputational damages. This moves the response to the next stage.
• During Breach Stage: The focus of this stage is to accomplish everything in the
previous stage while dealing with authorities, regulators, investors, and customers
without causing additional damages. As a result, we often see a significant shift in
resources from technical to legal and communication at this stage.
• After Stage: The objective of this stage is to contain breach damages and rebuild.
The effects of the breach stage often linger beyond the days in which the attack is
“in the news,” often years. Less tangible values such as trust and reputation lost can
take a very long time to rebuild. This stage also involves legal liability claims, on-site
auditor presence, and annual audits for several years.
Based on the cyber risk management decision cycle, attack stages, and response stages
as discussed previously, Figure 5 illustrates a corresponding response matrix, broken
down by stakeholders, underlining the role of each department at an organization in cyber
risk management.
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III. CONCLUSION: ELEVEN LESSONS LEARNED, AND A
CYBERSECURITY MODEL FOR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
Society’s commercial track record for security-by-design and security-by-default in logical
systems security is, unfortunately, not very strong in most cases. This is due in part to the
perceived unwillingness of the end customers to pay for the higher cost of security-bydesign. This trend is changing as the pain and damages from cyber threats get closer to
the consumer.
If the past is any indication, surface transportation systems will rush to innovate without
fully understanding the cybersecurity implications, let alone designing and implementing
secure-by-design or secure-by-default systems. The further security measures are from
the built-in design of a system, the more complex and difficult such a system is to protect.
Product liability and the standard of due care is interpreted differently in the physical
and digital worlds. Harm in the physical world is clearer than “digital” harm. Providers of
surface transportation systems are more likely to be liable for product safety failings than
a software platform provider would be for insecure third-party applications.
Relying on old paradigms and refusing to accept new truths make the job more difficult
and are a sure way to destroy value quickly. Defining key assumptions and presumptions
accurately will greatly improve the effectiveness of the strategy and resulting security
posture. Below are eleven key lessons learned from previous sections of the paper and
important truisms of the cybersecurity industry.
1.

Prime Directive: Not all assets are of equal
Security Scarce Resource
sensitivity, criticality, or business value.
Prime Directive
Given scarce cybersecurity resources,
the most valuable assets should be
“Ensure the adequate protection
protected first, the second-most valuable
of the most critical dependencies,
second, and so on. The idea is that, by
of the most valuable processes,
the time resources have been exhausted,
with the highest exposure.”
the most important system elements have
been adequately addressed. The Security
Scarce Resource Prime Directive, in the text box above, should guide where to
invest in cybersecurity. This assumes a knowledge of assets, where they are, and
what they are doing.

2.

Presumption: Today, security strategy must build sufficient resiliency to continue to
deliver the product and services securely to customers while being compromised.
This is the reality, and no security officer can be held to the standard to prevent any
and all possible attacks. Most organizations contain many assets of value to attackers.
Organizations of value are under constant attack and therefore in a constant state
of response to multiple incidents, fraud attempts, and investigations. This is simply
the reality. This presumption shifts security investments towards monitoring internal
activity, detecting unauthorized behavior, and responding with preventative controls
to stop the activity.
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3.

Security is a Degree-of-Difficulty: Any target can be compromised given enough
time and resources. The easier it is to compromise a target, the more likely less
sophisticated and resourced attackers will do so. How difficult should it be? There is
no device on an organization’s network that cannot be compromised if it is accessible
and controllable via that network. If it can be accessed for legitimate reasons, it can
be accessed for malicious reasons. The more difficult it is to accomplish each stage
of the attack, the less likely it is to be successful. As the difficulty level increases, the
number of attackers with the skills, resources, and persistence to accomplish the
compromise decreases.

4.

Stop Them from Getting Out: It is more critical for a business to stop the intent
of the attack, rather than the attack itself. Stopping hackers from getting out of the
system with critical data is more important than trying to keep them from getting in.
This is key to preventing an incident from escalating to a breach.

5.

Why Would I Be Attacked: As discussed in Section 3, understanding the vulnerability
of one’s organization is largely a matter of understanding one’s role in the larger ST
ecosystem and the assets that are of value to potential hackers.

6.

Fix IT First: Companies rarely maintain core IT best practices. Maintaining good
software and hardware hygiene is half the security battle. The risks and need for
security originates in large part from the major challenges of protecting bad IT. And
bad IT in most cases is a result of underfunding. More sophisticated countermeasures
to address more sophisticated and persistent attackers with more sinister intents
are not effective if the basics are left wide open and a teenage attacker is able to
penetrate an organization.

7.

Minimize and Harden Attack Surface: An organization’s “attack surface” is defined
by the number of Internet-facing IP addresses and their connected devices, each of
which is a potential point of vulnerability to be exploited by an attacker. The key is
to minimize the number of public IP addresses and ensure that connected devices
are securely configured, cannot be modified without detection, and all applicable
software patches are up to date. The likelihood of an attack is strongly associated
with the size and condition of the attack surface.

8.

Protection versus Security: Businesspeople care about protection; security people
care about security. Security delivered does not equal protection received. Business
assets are under threat, and whether a security technique to mitigate that threat
is effective or not, it must be verified using accepted test procedures, preferably
conducted by an independent evaluator. A security technology can be operating
“effectively” (as designed), but the efficacy of the technique against the threat may
be poor. For example, detection of known malware will be 100% effective in detecting
the exact same malware, but will detect almost no new attacks, because the attack
signature of almost every new attack is different.

9.

Internal vs External Control Frameworks: External frameworks are “one size
fits all,” objective-level security control sets that either organizations should comply
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with (according to industry standards) or organizations shall comply with (according
to government regulations). There are many external frameworks to choose from,
and they evolve on a periodic basis.11 There is nothing “wrong” with these control
frameworks, except that they may not align with the nature of a business and
specific risk profile, which, in turn, highly depends on the nature of core assets and
activities. An internal framework provides alignment between the security program,
the business, and the risk communication.
10. Compliant vs Secure: Out of a scarcity of resources and a desire to reduce
complexity and duplication, organizations sometimes adopt a well-known and widely
accepted external framework as their internal enterprise control framework. In doing
so, they avoid the costs and time involved with managing another specialized, internal
framework by complying with the standards of an external framework—an approach
sometimes called security-by-compliance. However, a compliant environment is not
necessarily secure. But it is almost certain that a secure environment is always
compliant. Therefore, it is highly advisable that any organization should adopt an
internal security control framework optimized to their intrinsic character and aligned
to risks to their net worth, current revenue, and revenue growth. These business
priorities are translated into Management Business Objectives and managed
through to delivery and success. The internal framework should be based on a set
of Management Security Objectives tied to each of the business objectives with the
goal to protect it.
11. Approach to Security: Each leader will have a somewhat different intrinsic
approach to cybersecurity determined in part by their personality, education, and
past management experience. These differences will, in turn, influence management
methods, communication styles, and approaches to building a security program,
or lack thereof. Examples of approaches include: a technology and risk mitigation
approach, where the focus is on IT measures to reduce the likelihood of a compromise;
a legal, risk averse, and indemnification approach, where legal instruments such
as contracts to specify onward care obligations are used to assign responsibility
outside the organization to limit exposure; a check-list and security-by-compliance
approach, where external compliance regulations drives the nature of the security
program; and a business and risk acceptance approach, where business tends
to take on excessive risks. When only one approach is dominant, other types of
risk are inappropriately addressed and under-managed. It is important to seek the
right balance of risk treatment measures provided by specialized experts while also
ensuring a powerful, accountable and conflict-of-interest-free reporting chain.
To address the current lack of adequate cybersecurity in ST organizations, Part B of this paper
proposes a Surface Transportation Cyber-Protection Model and Reference Architecture,
which outlines the assets specific to transportation systems that have the potential to be
compromised by hackers. This model and reference architecture incorporates the motives
and risks discussed above, and integrates the following essential considerations:12
• Hybrid: Physical and cyber systems, since cyber systems increasingly control
physical systems.
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• Multi-disciplinary: Technical, legal, regulatory, and fiduciary aspects of system
design and management.
• Integrated: Moving from the strategic to the tactical and moving from objectives to
implementation techniques.
• Community-based: Participant ecosystem roles and responsibilities.
• Standardized: “One Ecosystem Protection” provides security to entire systems.
• Multi-Regulatory/Standard-Based: Adequate protection that meets all external
security regulatory and standards.
• Demonstrable: Measurable across a spectrum of perspectives to increasing
degrees-of-precision.
The Model is composed of three key elements. The cyber threat component provides the
ability to understand potential threats. The cyber protection component allows organizations
to model courses of action and countermeasures to threats. The surface transportation
model identifies the common potential layers of attack in surface transportation systems.
Each element of the model has an underlying reference architecture, that is, a framework
through which it is modeled and understood. The cyber threat reference architecture
illustrates the steps of a successful cyberattack. Its cyber protection counterpart illustrates
how to defend against each one of these steps. The surface transportation reference
architecture points to specific infrastructural weaknesses within each layer of a surface
transportation system.
Through a holistic model such as the above and better understanding of key cybersecurity
concepts and attack processes, we hope to foster an interdisciplinary debate on strategies
for mitigating and managing cyberattacks on surface transportation topics. We also hope
to underline the sheer lack of and need for stronger security for both physical transportation
systems and the data associated with them.
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APPENDIX A: RAIL SECURITY GUIDANCE
1.

US Government: DHS: Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA): https://
www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis

2.

Best Practice Recommendations: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
Recommended-Practices

3.

The Future of Smart Cities: Cyber-Physical Infrastructure Risk. https://ics-cert.
us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCIA%20-%20The%20Future%20of%20
Smart%20Cities%20-%20Cyber-Physical%20Infrastructure%20Risk.pdf

4.

Government of United Kingdom: Rail Cyber Security Guidance to Industry,
February 2016: https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-industryperformance/2016-02-cyber-security-rail-cyber-security-guidance-to-industry.pdf

5.

TRB’s E-Circular 226: Transportation System Resilience: Preparation, Recovery,
and Adaptation. Benefits and Needs for an Integrated Approach to Cyber–Physical
Security for Transportation, Rae Zimmerman, New York University Wagner
Graduate School of Public Service; Michael G. Dinning, U.S. Department of
Transportation Volpe Center: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec226.
pdf

6.

Protection of Transportation Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks: A Primer: http://
www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/174382.aspx

7.

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,
Rev 4: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
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APPENDIX B: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT LANDSCAPE
State-of-the-art thinking and unbiased analysis of the threat landscape based on actual
breach forensics: US. Secret Service and Verizon data breach investigations report, now
in its tenth year: https://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/
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APPENDIX C: RAIL-RELATED INCIDENTS
1.

City of Lodz, Poland tram system hacked by a 14-year-old schoolboy,
causing derailment and injuries, 2008: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/1575293/Schoolboy-hacks-into-citys-tram-system.html

2.

Train virus disrupts signaling, dispatching result in delays across eastern US,
2003: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/virus-disrupts-train-signals/

3.

WannaCryRansomware attack impacts Germany’s Deutsche Bahn system,
ransomware message appears on station screens, May 2017:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A;
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/cyber-attack-hits-german-trainstations-hackerstarget-deutsche/

4.

“The Indian Railway Minister, Suresh Prabhu has said that ensuring cyber security of
the railway’s in the day to day operations is one of the most important priority,” July
2017: http://www.ehackingnews.com/2017/07/railways-to-focus-on-cyber-security.
html

5.

UK Rail Infrastructure under Attack, 2016: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
2016/07/12/uk-rail-network-hit-by-multiple-cyber-attacks-last-year/

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

22

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ST
IT
SCE
CISO
CIO

Surface Transportation
Information Technology
Security Control Expressions
Chief Information Security Officer
Chief Information Officer
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and technology transfer, we help create a connected world. MTI leads the four-university Mineta Consortium for Transportation
Mobility, a Tier 1 University Transportation Center funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants
and donations.
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities:
Research
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of
government and the private sector to foster the development
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas
include: bicycle and pedestrian issues; financing public and private
sector transportation improvements; intermodal connectivity
and integration; safety and security of transportation systems;
sustainability of transportation systems; transportation / land use /
environment; and transportation planning and policy development.
Certified Research Associates conduct the research. Certification
requires an advanced degree, generally a Ph.D., a record of
academic publications, and professional references. Research
projects culminate in a peer-reviewed publication, available on
TransWeb, the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu).
Education
The Institute supports education programs for students seeking a
career in the development and operation of surface transportation
systems. MTI, through San José State University, offers an AACSBaccredited Master of Science in Transportation Management and
graduate certificates in Transportation Management,Transportation
Security, and High-Speed Rail Management that serve to prepare
the nation’s transportation managers for the 21st century.With the

active assistance of the California Department ofTransportation
(Caltrans), MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-the-art
videoconference network throughout the state of California
and via webcasting beyond, allowing working transportation
professionals to pursue an advanced degree regardless of their
location. To meet the needs of employers seeking a diverse
workforce, MTI’s education program promotes enrollment to
under-represented groups.
Information and Technology Transfer
MTI utilizes a diverse array of dissemination methods and
media to ensure research results reach those responsible
for managing change. These methods include publication,
seminars, workshops, websites, social media, webinars,
and other technology transfer mechanisms. Additionally,
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to
professional organizations and journals and works to
integrate the research findings into the graduate education
program. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation- related
publications is integrated into San José State University’s
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library.
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